









Confession as Residue of Political Culture: An Essay on Michael Foucault
Introduction




The question that arises from Foucault’s analysis is that of the intersection of politics and any specific set of practices. In terms of this analysis one area that suggests itself is the sub-discipline of political culture. That is, since Foucault was primarily interested in the informal workings of power in society, is it possible to pursue this question from a Foucaultian perspective and yet maintain a focus on the formal category of political culture? For it is here that practices that seem to be purely individual activities merge with societal praxes that then serve to produce and reproduce not only individual orientations but the far wider scope of social and political relationships. Political culture is also useful because of the significance it affords to questions of authority, a mainstay of traditional political analysis. For one of the areas that political culture scholars examine is how authority is structured both in terms of the socialization process as well as the loci of authority itself. This allows for the comparative analysis of authority from one culture to the next as well as providing a useful theoretical outlook for the study of sub-cultures. For example, one can see the relationship between political culture and the confessional practices of a culture on the question of authority in the recent development of confessorless confessions, wherein, as evinced by recent trends in popular culture. These developments have underscored the ubiquity of confessional practice as a specific cultural marker, with many young people using sites such as “My space” and “Facebook” to provide ongoing commentary, confession by other means, about their lives. Importantly, while these online journals may evoke comparisons to earlier images of diaries and journals of times gone by, the current forms represent a departure from earlier ones because, because of their unique confessional quality. Earlier diaries and journals were never intended to be read by such large audiences since, because of prevailing norms, were extremely circumscribed. This is evinced in the “shock” that sometimes accompanies the revelation of third party recovered personal journals and diaries. With the new twenty-four hour online confessional however, there is universal access to the same categories of personal information. In many instances these online versions take their lead from celebrity informed entertainment programming and so online confessions exhibit a mixture of self promotion and trivial detail, the overall effect of which is to occlude the elephant in the middle of the postmodern living room, the alienation from self and others that is implied. 
	Some extremely new web sites use the term “confession” as part of their internet identifier so it is clear that confession and the question of what is to be confessed and to whom it is to be confessed is very much a part of contemporary global internet culture. These new forms are universally accessible and involve levels of detail, often remarkable for their banality, that were unheard of in previous times. Undoubtedly Face book and My Space are but two examples of how technological practices have merged with cultural developments to allow segments of society to engage in new forms of confession.​[1]​ Some commentators in the popular media have raised concerns over the misuse of such private information however, from a political vantage point these developments may signal important changes, changes that may already be underway, in the political culture of those societies where these emerging forms of confessional practice hold sway. Before proceeding further to discuss the politics of the new confessional culture and by way of defining terms, it may be useful to say a word about political culture. The term was initially used by political scientists Gabriel Almond and was subsequently employed by Almond and Verba  in The Civic Culture. As a concept, political culture provides a basis for comparing diverse polities for although individuals were socialized to the beliefs, attitudes and norms of the society, they were also themselves products and agents of this self same processes. Political culture has presented surprisingly complex conceptual problems however, developments in the use of political culture have tended to follow the overall theoretical difficulty of situating the individual within the wider social context. So after his inaugural use of political culture, wherein the emphasis was on defining orientations of political behavior within a social context. Later analyses including that of Almond and Verba (1963) emphasized how overall orientations may be structured to account for variations in individual behaviors. Although not meant to be an overarching, the widely-cited and classical formulation of political cultures along the lines of parochial or participant evinces the tendency of political culture to serve two masters, individual variation and overarching telos. One of the underpinnings of political culture as a theoretical term is the extent to which relationships of authority in a society are mediated by scientific expertise, thus in the vernacular of Almond and Verba in parochial political culture the role of the religious figure looms fairly large as a source of authority; in so-called participant political cultures, this role is performed by the secular authority figure using scientific knowledge to establish their claims of legitimacy. The priest, rabbi or other religious figure may establish the context of human behaviors so forgiveness or confession in a traditional political culture is likely to be confined both psychologicall and geographically, whereas modern political cultures are likely to have behaviors scientifically grounded in an authority structure no less powerful but perhaps a good deal more opaque, where the therapist, or councilor will perform the role of confessor, still with confined boundaries. In the case of the therapist this is less likely to be the case at least abstractly in that as a member of a professional organization with established ethical norms, the contemporary therapist might include as part of their published account statistical abstracts, data even case histories, but though the information is distributed and disseminated geographically, it is done so within the confines of confidentiality. Viewed in this was it may be useful to think of confessional practice as providing an important vantage point on the political culture of a society and even as a window into subcultures. 
	It is within this context that Michael Foucault’s work sheds light on the theoretical meaning attached to these diverse confessional practices. In particular Foucault’s lectures on confessional practices given at New York University and Dartmouth affords the opportunity to revisit the connection between political culture and confessional practice. For Foucault practices facilitate an often unacknowledged development right at the heart of contemporary politics, the creation and maintenance of identity, part and parcel of which are the disciplining techniques he associated with late modernity. We can see this in his discussion of subjectivity where, as he notes that there are two meanings of subject.  One can of course be subject to someone else in terms of dependence or influence.  However one may also be immersed in their own identity through, Foucault argues either conscience or some form of self-knowledge. In any event these different meanings both imply a manifest instance of power which in which subjugation and the establishment of a subject coalesce.












For Foucault values and objectives including norms regarding what counts as normal and deviant, are values and objectives that are historically initiated and continue to exert their influence as a residue often in the form of a practice or technique. It is akin to Freud’s concept of psychic mimesis in which the life of an Other is interiorized as a form of behavior or as a ritual. This analogy underscores an important difference. In the case of Foucault these are socially initiated practices and so the scope and level of analysis are historical. In some instances these practices are imbedded within institutional structures, but in other cases the institutions have disappeared even while the practices continue to inform the thought processes and behaviors of individuals, and so, in a sense they exhibit a discernable tendency to take on a life of their own. One contemporary example here is the tendency among some American foreign policymakers to continue the practices associated with the existence of the Cold War. Cold warriors are individuals who continue to think and engage in the practices of the Cold War long after its end. 
One consequence of this is that for Foucault the reach of political history extends much further and is far subtler than is generally held to be the case. Foucault sometimes uses the analogy of a chain to underscore his concept of power but elsewhere he describes it as a “net-like organization” wherein individuals themselves are “the vehicles of power and not its point of application.” i This is perhaps a controversial point but it is somewhat less so when fully explicated. For while it may appear that Foucault is underscoring one’s complicity in one’s own subjection to power this seems to miss the larger point, that individuals are enmeshed in a net of meanings, practices and discourses that form part of a regime of knowledge/power and that, further, that at any particular moment these may be operative and enacted through the agency of the individual. Thus, from the perspective of political culture, these intersections and overlapping practices and techniques are transversals of power that help to make culture an informing category for political power, transforming it explicitly into political culture. Individuals then are the carriers of power not necessarily in the sense that they are living the pursuit of their own will to power; but rather, more accurately, they are better seen as agents that oppose and discipline others in the realization of existing relationships and centers of power. 




Foucault’s work has benefited from some several biographies and some of them take special note of the influence exerted on his outlook by his early experiences with institutions. He was fascinated with the seemingly apolitical techniques of power and authority that they used. Thus both in his study of the panopticon, an early model of the ideal prison, and his account of the development of the clinic and the asylum there is a marked attention to the neutral appearance of such institutions, an appearance that often masks their paradoxically potent, if not and virulent form of a subspecies of politics, that of the politics of the Other.ii Foucault draws on his earlier noted analogy of a chain to illustrate this aspect of his concept of power, to write that “individuals are vehicles of power, not its point of application.” (Foucault: 1980, 98). Foucault also cites the need to “decipher technical prowess,” asking why it is that this form of expertise appears at this particular time, as for example he notes in his account of the panopticon. Foucault saw in the panopticon a cipher of modernity wherein,  “there is no need for arms, physical violence, or material constraints, just a gaze.  The emphasis on forensics is an interesting contemporary example, for the ongoing use of the term in fields as disparate as psychology and criminology evinces the obsessive nature of surveillance in the postmodern society.  The point of origin of such new forms of knowledge and the power they encapsulate is equally noteworthy, for again as he notes about the panopticon: “The point it seems to me is that architecture began at the end of the 18th Century to become involved in problems of population, health and the urban question, and this includes the management of urban areas as well. Although the panopticon procedures became widespread, “it was really only in the penitentiary institutions that Bentham’s utopia could be fully expressed in material form. In the 1830s the panopticon became the architectural program of most prison projects. It was the most direct way of expressing “the intelligence of discipline in stone” (Rabinow: 1984, 217). So too, it may be argued, forensic psychology has escaped the psych lab to appear elsewhere in society as citizen profiling both with the structures of the state and the wider corporate and cultural environment. 
In his later works Foucault shifts his focus somewhat toward the individual and came to view institutions are looked upon primarily as locations for the potential problemizing of power, authority and freedom. Thus, society’s construction of individual identity becomes a primary theme of Foucault’s analysis of what he terms the “gnomic self,” a feature that he discusses in his lectures. For Foucault, the gnomic self, much like Fichte’s self-positing subject, or Sartre’s for-itself, is a radically non-essentialist concept of the self and is an instance of what Schurmann referred to as a preigrinal identity, one that is established through action and discourse and quite simply does not exist until a specific discourse or set of actions are undertaken. It is in the context then, that of the perigrinal identity, that his account of confession should be viewed.




One might ask about t the relationship between such self-surveillance and the new forms of confessorless confession. The answer is that althoughIt seems obvious that this connection has been dramatized in recent years in a global context where new techniques for eliciting confessions and undertaking surveillance have been accompanied by a return to older, cold war venues for undertaking them, these new forms or blatant expressions of elicited confessions and surveillance and the relationship between them are not exactly the focus of Foucault’s analysis, even though he surely anticipated the growth of surveillance by the state and the obsession-like attention to confession that all but defines authority within the postmodern state. Instead, Foucault is more focused on the far less explicit manifestations of this relationship. In particular, he was concerned with those that involve epistemology and the regime of knowledge. Here, it may be useful in the context to consider the kinds of discussions that take place between a physician and his or her patient. Recall that for Foucault the more subtle forms of the regime of knowledge involve those where the individual undertakes a practice of self-surveillance which, because they are socially and historically informed, equips the individual with a kind of training about themselves, so that, for example, when an individual meets their physician and gives them a run down on their assessment of their health, they do so by confessing what the were instructed to confess by watching the media. Part of this is the uncritical acceptance of the self as a “patient,” an identity that is always and everywhere present as part of one’s postmodern social identity. When the “patient” arrives then, there is a good deal that is confessed by the patient that has little to do directly with the physician qua physician but a great deal to do with the physician as a venue of social and historical authority. The physician then is an intersection of power and knowledge and the agency of the physician does double duty, serving as healer, even while as authority figure, perpetuating the maintenance of docile bodies of subjects through the “patients” own confessional practices. 
The self-recognition of guilt becomes the core element of surveillance for those who are subjected to “total institutions,” but have, on a private scale, brought self surveillance into the physician-patient discourse in an interesting and often less than transparent way, for in the media age it is common for the individual’s self-surveillance to be informed by suggestive and fear-generating commercials by the pharmaceutical industry’s regime of medical knowledge. However, such commercials usually advise, after having administered the appropriate dose of fearful watchfulness, that the individual should “consult with their personal physician.” iv  
Then, in due course the individual arrives in the physician’s office to detail their fears of course, but also to “confess” whatever culpability they may have been influenced into accepting. In a similar way, the use of psychological self-surveillance generates a will to confess that highlights the fact that while viewing television they were applying these commercials directly and without critical mediation and underscores the almost permanent state of confessional practice that citizens have been placed in. Often this is dramatized on popular television shows where the hapless individual is dissected for the length of the show with various strategies of prevarication or denial attempted. Usually the final segment of the show ushers in a dramatic showdown with the confessor-as-psychologist to whom the “guest” now freely, openly, and more often than not remorsefully, confesses. From the perspective of Foucault’s account of power and authority the important question here is not necessarily whether the confession was healthy or done under duress; rather, it is the intended audience and their own reaction to this technique. It generates a climate of self-surveillance that individuals subsequently make a part of their own repertoire of confessional practice, for it now has the all important imprimatur of television. Furthermore, individuals who have picked up the techniques of the confessor are now free to exercise the same techniques on others throughout the society thus realizing Foucault’s point that “individuals are the vehicles of power, not its point of application.” v 
	Over time the individual continues to receive ever more advanced tutorials on the correct techniques for self-surveillance even while enhancing the power and scope of the existent regime of knowledge-power, as is indicated by the adoption of a vernacular of self-surveillance and a corresponding nomenclature for the techniques of self-surveillance. In short, in the contemporary era surveillance and confession go hand and glove and are mediated by an electronic media that instantly captures both the content and format of what is to be confessed.  Foucault discussed this aspect of power in his work, Discipline and Punish where surveillance becomes an actual feature of the landscape. The disciplinary techniques that were honed in the clinic have escaped the confines of the institution and has become part of the language of contemporary political discourse. It is not, for example, uncommon for politicians to be faced with question after question about this or that miscue, often captured on videotape or cell phone cameras, wherein each denial is met with an instant replay of the event until the individual finally confesses. This is a mirror image of the procedures used in the nineteenth-century asylums, to be discussed shortly, where confessing mental illness followed similar ritualistic questioning. As he did in his his discussions of the panopticon, Foucault is insistent that the primary issue is not the structures themselves but rather the underlying phenomenological question, what kind of a mind would develop a building such as a panopticon? Not what kind of individual mind, but rather what kind of social mind? So too one might ask today, what kind of social mind would constitute such forms of confessorless confession? The panopticon in many ways is no longer necessary and in terms of the contemporary forms of power one might well paraphrase Sartre’s famous statement from No Exit and ask, not what need is there of the pinchers, the rack and the gridiron, but rather, what need is there for the panopticon when there is continuous monitoring and self surveillance of the modern state.   




Another important manifestation of the relationship between surveillance and confession is the increasingly refined use of focus groups by corporate and administrative officials. In the focus groups we see writ large many of the important features that Foucault described in his explication of the growth of the surveillance state. For those who are unfamiliar, the focus group is a collection of individuals with a similar demographic profile to that of the “target” group that the officials wish to influence. Once selected by the organization these individuals are sequestered in a room, which can be studied by their hosts either remotely or from an adjoining room that has a two-way mirror. Their responses to questions are videotaped and then scrutinized and discussed. At the end of the process the focus group has provided the sponsor with a detailed account of their reactions both intellectual and emotional to whatever commodities may have been placed before them ranging from political ads to toothpaste. The idea behind this is that focus groups will enable corporate and organizational interests to learn exactly what is on the mind of their potential clients tell them and how to use these ideas and emotional reactions. So, in a way the focus group may be thought of as a present day micro-panopticon with the obvious exception that the guards, in this case the corporate sponsors, are not themselves under surveillance except to the extent that they themselves are, through their other roles, also a part of the “target audience.”  Our analysis of these expressions of surveillance in contemporary Americana society is an extension of the kinds of focus that Foucault put forth in his account of power and authority and helps to underscore Foucault’s major concern that power is perceived as something extra-institutional and informal.
In his lectures at Dartmouth entitled “Subjectivity and Truth, and Christianity and Confession, Foucault provided a sustained explication of how the practices of the individual intersect with the residue of bygone social formations.  He  argues that these continue to influence the present as social technologies. The lectures provide a focus to the unique way in which Foucault uses the term “practice,” and how this intersects with individual identity and ideology. Foucault notes in the lectures while from his vantage point there are no ultimate criteria of truth, and cautions that one is correct to be suspicious of ultimate truth claims. He suggests that this does not mean that the absence of said criteria can itself serve as a substitute. For Foucault the situation is radical in that one must sign onto the truth about oneself knowing full well that such an undertaking emerges anew, and without the certainty established through a verification evinced in any specific pragmatic course of action. For example, in the therapeutic model of the self, a hallmark of practical action from William James to the present, the successful result of analysis is a verification of the practical model of the self and provides a kind of Platonic moment of epiphany. Undoubtedly this is a potential weakness of Foucault’s philosophy but one need not sign on to this aspect of his thought in order to appreciate or make use of his unique account of what is entailed by everyday practices. From a theoretical point of view it is worth noting that this aspect of Foucault’s thought mirrors his assessment of rationality where he notes that the question is not whether or not there is rationality, obviously there is, but the question is what to do about it (Rabinow, 1984: 248-249). 
	Foucault’s use of history represents another departure from the pragmatic one, especially on the meaning of practice. For although both the pragmatic account and that of Foucault reject the methodology of grounding ideas in a philosophy of history, or any role for teleology of the sort one would find in Hegel, for example, there is a distinction to make when it comes to epistemology, as was underscored in the discussion of power/knowledge. It is important to recall that for Foucault, the residue of history, historically initiated or mimicked that are “rediscovered” may not be practical at all. In fact they may be anti-practical and yet their actuality impinges on the present as a component of the web of knowledge/power. Foucault notes this in, The History of Sexuality, vol.2 illustrates Foucault’s use of history is central to his project and just as it rejects a teleological account, so too it differs considerably from those approaches to history which simply catalogue the empirical record of events. Speaking of his project of historical study, he writes: “It was a matter of analyzing, not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their ideologies, but the problemizations through which being offers itself as necessarily, thought--and the practices on the basis of which these problemizations are formed” (Foucault, 1985: 11).  
	For Foucault there is a relationship between ontology and practice such that from the one side subjectivities are constituted by this relationship, and from the other side, one is self-constituting in such a way that one literally constitutes the truth about oneself. That is to say, the truth about oneself does not exist prior to one’s constitution of it. However, the relationship between ontology and practice in the lectures are influenced by the idea that the practices one engages in come to constitute the ontological categories used to talk about the self. The kind of practice that Foucault is especially interested in the lecture is discursive practice. Thus, discursive practices provide the nomenclature of subjectivity as well the standards used to establish identity. He establishes this point by recalling an interrogation of a patient by a psychiatrist in which the “patient” is administered cold showers until he confesses the “truth” about himself. Foucault takes pains to underscore that it is not merely the admission of madness by the “patient” that is the goal but a certain comportment or willingness to constitute himself and to then identify himself as such that is the actual goal of the therapy. So in the lectures there is a marked difference in the relationship between ontology and practice. As was noted in the discussion of contemporary confession, a confessor need not actually exist in order for the subject to be influenced. The influence exists, as Foucault describes in his account of the asylum and the clinic, and informs the practices of those who have internalized the operative social technologies of the culture and sub-culture. These influences may also be derived from the virtual culture of the Internet and the social networking sites that thrive there. For Foucault the point is the same, human being, or ontology, is constituted as a subject, and is transformed through these practices of the self. 
Viewed from another point of view, one of the major strengths of Foucault’s account of subjectivity is his refusal to view any particular subject as neutral, let alone natural. Obviously such an approach is at odds with formal approaches to the study of power, a point that surfaced in his famous debate with Noam Chomsky. For Foucault, this is because given the manner and the ways in which subjectivity is constituted, the processes by which the subject is constituted, means that a process that can be discerned only through a genealogy or archeology of the subject often goes largely unaccounted, or can, by formalist approaches to power and politics since these, Foucault argues, are assumed to be part of the landscape and residue of history. For example, scholars have noted that biases and practices fall through the cracks of the liberal democratic rights based tradition. Those who study the Civil Rights movement in particular have been insistent that the residue of racism that is found in both symbolism and language can exist side by side with the formal rights based institutions of the liberal democratic state. Additionally, while It is worth noting that in defining the self Foucault describes one as a speaking, living, working, being, the deeper question is one of ontology even in instances where the issue at hand is ethics, since the energy behind many ethical debates stem from a prior politics of history. And, it is exactly this relationship, the one between ontology and subjectivity that comes front and center in the phenomenon of confession. For following Foucault, one can argue that confession may be thought of as the merging of knowledge and will, so that an identity is established or reinforced. Disclosing the genealogy of the subject may also be thought of a part of what Foucault described an overall critical ontology of ourselves designed to make visible the conditions of possibility for a language and structure of social control (Foucault, 1993: 200).The focus on the techniques and technologies of the self is a consistent part of Foucault’s approach to power, but  the point of origin for these particular lectures by Foucault’s is Habermas’ delineation of three types of social technique. The first of these is that of production, the second that of communication, and the third, those which permit one to determine the conduct of individuals, to impose certain wills on them, and to submit them to certain ends or objectives (1993: 203). In his account however, Foucault adds a fourth type of social technique. Foucault argues that this forth one is based on his analysis of history--the technology of the self whereby one establishes changes in their own souls; on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection, purity, of supernatural power, and so on (1993:203). Foucault wants us to view confession as something that perhaps has some modern roots in Christianity and other religious traditions but that lives on in the contemporary era in psychotherapy and in the many mundane instances wherein one may be externally coerced and self-disciplined into confessing in such a way that one is, at the same time, constituting oneself as a particular subject. One of Foucault’s criticisms of other approaches to power is that they fail to give a complete account of the full interplay of technologies of culture and those of formal power. For example, the neutral use of the term political culture seems to suggest that the intersection of power and culture is simply a given, a social fact. However, for Foucault a concept such as political culture refers to an actual state of power and knowledge, a regime of knowledge, to use Foucault’s terminology. This is a criticism that he mentions in the lecture, as well as the aforementioned connection between technologies of the self and ontology figures prominently in his understanding of power. For, the self, and its determinations, are nothing so much as the multiple historical intersections of these technologies (1993: 203).vi




Power then, is delineated by the detailed analysis of the interplay of the practices and technologies by which ontology is brought into play. Foucault makes this point in his lecture when he notes that “power consists in complex relations: These relations involve a set of rational techniques, and the efficiency of those is due to a subtle integration of coercion--technologies and self –technologies” (1993: 204). 
This is made clear in Foucault’s illustration of the term the gnomic self in the lectures. While noting that confession represents an important example of the technology of the self, he maintains that his primary interest is in explicating the more general point that the constituting of the subject is the most significant category for discussing power in the contemporary context.  He is primarily interested in the technologies involving the discovery and foundation of the truth about oneself and the way in which practices that are associated with such self truth have been transformed by the intersection of technologies. 
An additional aspect of confession for Foucault concerns the relationship, noted above, between ethics and ontology. For Foucault seeks to examine how it is that the ancient prescription of knowing ones self became the monastic precept confess, to your spiritual guide, each of your thoughts. It is this transition, Foucault maintains, that marks the generally unacknowledged origin of the hermeneutics of the self.




The point is that the examination is not about the discovery of a truth hidden in the subject (1993: 207), but of recalling the truth forgotten by the subject. This is further underscored by another text from Seneca, this time a correspondence between himself and a student, Serenus (from De Tranquilliate Animi). Serenus has come to Seneca because he feels a certain malaise and says that he wants verum fateri, to tell the truth, to Seneca (1993: 208). 
Foucault rhetorically asks what is the truth. Is it some dark secret or something weighty? No, it is the rather mundane business of liking to make long speeches, and so on. Foucault distinguishes the Christian notion of concupisensia from Seneca’s account of his student’s confession, noting as he does so that what the latter wanted from Seneca was that force which emerges from a discussion about oneself (1993: 209). This brings us to the heart of the matter both in terms of the lecture itself, as well as the distinction between Foucault’s account of practice and the tradition. Foucault situates Seneca’s discussion within the context of the Greek notion of the gnome, and what he later describes as the gnomic self. As he puts it: “We can see that such a practice of confession and consultation remains within the framework of what the Greeks for a long time called the gnome. The term gnome designates the unity of will and knowledge; it designates also a brief piece of discourse through which truth appeared with all its force and encrusts itself in the soul of the people (1993: 210).





From the perspective of Foucault’s analysis of confession the emphasis needs to be shifted from the acts of confession toward the attitude of the one who confesses. On this score Foucault is quite correct for even if one consults the early Christian writers on the topic, from Augustine to Thomas Kempis, the essential component is not the actual confessions themselves, nor even the “transgressions,” but the interior disposition—a certain contriteness. In fact, this attitude toward oneself does not begin with Christianity but may be seen in the texts of the Old Testament and its proscriptions.viii Foucault’s description of the genealogy of confession has a marked similarity to some aspects of the Hegelian paradigm. After a highly interesting discussion of the different historical forms that confession took in early Christianity, Foucault concludes with a discussion of the relationship between knowledge and being. He notes that with Christianity the two are separated as a precognition for the “constitution of thought as a field of subjective data, which are to be interpreted (1993:222).The continuous verbalization undertaken between the acolyte and the spiritual director, informed as it is by the dictates of obedience Confession then is a synergy between will and intellect and represents a decision to sign onto a certain type of subjectivity and it is this that constitutes the creation of subjectivity. It is finally this genealogy of the subject that comprises the objective of Foucault’s analysis. 




However, practice also occupies a central place in Foucault’s understanding of liberation. The latter is not something established once and for all, or which can be assigned an institutional or juridical framework exclusively. Instead, liberty itself is dependent on, or derived from, practice. In fact, he maintains that: “Liberty is practice. So there may, in fact, always be a certain number of projects whose aim is to modify some constraints, to loosen, or even break them, but none of these projects can, simply by its nature, assure that people will have liberty automatically, that it will be established by the project itself. The liberty of men is never assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them. This is why almost all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned around. Not because they are ambiguous, but simply because liberty is what must be exercised (1984: 245). 


















^1	 Notes “Facebook” is a social networking website launched on February 4, 2004. The website is owned and operated by Facebook, Inc., the privately held parent company of the website. The free-access website allows users to join networks, such as a school, place of employment, or geographic region, to connect and interact with other people. Users can post messages for their friends to see, and update their personal profile to notify friends about themselves. The name of the website refers to the paper facebooks depicting members of a campus community that some American colleges and preparatory schools give to incoming students, faculty, and staff, as a way to get to know other people on campus.
^2	 Agents of political socialization are those who introduce others to the norms and beliefs of whatever group they are members of. Thus, new recruits receive their “rules of the road” not only from their superiors but from peers who have already gone through the process. The Internet has expanded this tendency whereby formerly marginal groups of the far-right recruit new members through online web pages replete with stories, “confessions” of new members. 
